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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE BURTON-LAUE DEBATE 
Richard E. Rubenstein1 
From its inception, the field of conflict resolution has appealed strongly to practitioners, 
researchers, and theorists interested in social betterment. Most conflict resolvers would probably 
agree that their efforts are motivated, at least in part, by the conception of a Good (or at least a 
Better) Society considerably less violent and contentious, more peaceful and cooperative, than 
the existing social order. Many would also affirm that in order to reach this goal, the sources of 
violence and contention, which include cultural norms sanctioning or glorifying violence, 
invidious and discriminatory "isms" (racism, sexism, etc.), gross socioeconomic and political 
inequities, and over-reliance on formal, adversarial decision-making procedures need to be 
eliminated or, at least, mitigated. And many would assert, in addition, that the methods of 
making these changes should be consistent, so far as possible, with the aims sought to be 
achieved: that is, they should rely on nonviolent conflict resolution.2 
This conception of social justice is blurry, but not altogether incoherent. It comports with the 
thinking of a good many European social democrats and American liberals. Yet its vagueness 
and essential negativity ("the Good Society is not violent, prejudiced, grossly unequal, etc.") 
leave crucial questions unanswered. What positive principles define a socially just community? 
How might these principles be embodied in human institutions and practices? And how, 
practically speaking, do we get there from here? If Laura Nader’s critique of dispute resolution as 
embodying an unconscious and contestable "social harmony model"3 still has some bite, this is 
because many in the field continue to link violence with contention and peace with cooperation 
without prioritizing these values. Nor do they make it clear whether the Good Society is 
primarily a social end-state that may be reached by a variety of means, or whether the 
relationship between cooperation and peace is causal, i.e., one of means to ends. 
That these issues are seldom discussed and disputed openly by conflict resolution specialists may 
be attributable to the field’s practical bent, the desire to maintain a "common front" against 
skeptical devotes of power politics, a general distaste for contention, or other factors.4 But our 
own teachings tell us that serious differences of opinion, if unexamined, are likely to disrupt the 
façade of unity at some later date. For this reason, it seems worthwhile to recall a series of 
respectful but contentious "conversations" on the subject - a debate, in fact - between two 
important early leaders in the field of conflict studies: John W. Burton and James H. Laue. I will 
describe their exchange of views in some detail before commenting on its implications for 
conceptions of social justice.  
The Interlocutors: John Burton and Jim 
Laue 
The year was 1988. John Burton had arrived at George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict 
Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) two years earlier, after a long career that included a stormy but 
memorable period of service following World War II as Australia’s youngest-ever Head of the 
Foreign Office. Burton had played a role in the early organization of the United Nations, had 
participated in an official capacity in helping to decolonize the British Empire, and had founded 
the first European conflict resolution center at the University of London. A pioneer in the theory 
and practice of analytical conflict resolution, he had at length come to America to work with 
Edward Azar at the University of Maryland’s Center for Conflict Management and International 
Development. In 1987, one year after accepting a position at George Mason University, he and 
his new colleagues invited James H. Laue to take up the first endowed chair in the field, the 
Lynch Professorship of Conflict Resolution.  
Jim Laue, although considerably younger than John Burton, was another pioneer of the new 
field. In the 1960s, Laue went from graduate study at Harvard into the Community Relations 
Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, an agency reflecting the government’s "tilt" towards 
the civil rights movement, as well as its interest in social peace. Working under director Roger 
Wilkins, he worked with such leaders as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and was with King when he 
was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. Later, he would play an important role in  
efforts which led to the establishment of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and would found one of the 
first university-based conflict resolution practice centers in the United States: the Conflict Clinic, 
Inc. Laue’s particular specialty as an academic writer was the social ethics of third-party 
intervention, a subject that never ceased to concern him.5 His death in 1993 at the age of 56 
deprived the field of a gifted, much-admired practitioner and thinker. 
In some ways, the older Australian and the younger Midwesterner had much in common. Both 
were idealistic white men with origins in the rural middle class, and family upbringings strongly 
influenced by Protestantism of the "Social Gospel" type. Both were high achievers as university 
students, and both emerged determined to put their intellectual skills to work for the practical 
betterment of society. Burton and Laue had both gone to work as public servants for 
"progressive" political regimes, and had later created academic institutions and NGOs in order to 
develop, generalize, and apply the lessons (positive and negative) learned in public service. 
Although John’s forte was theory and Jim’s practice, both recognized the interdependence of 
these two areas of endeavor and combined teaching and writing with practice as facilitators or 
mediators. 
At the same time, however, differences of background, experience, and philosophy strongly 
influenced each man’s thinking. John Burton had written important books in international 
relations and communications theory as well as in conflict resolution, and was a specialized 
practitioner, focusing his efforts on the use of analytical workshops to deal with violent ethno-
nationalist conflicts.6 Jim’s first love was practice, and the scope of his practice was very wide, 
ranging from organizational disputes and conflicts over land and water use to religious quarrels 
and ethnic struggles. Jim’s religious motivation and affiliations grew, if anything, more intense 
with age. By contrast, although John’s father was a leading Methodist minister, his general 
attitude towards organized religion was that it was mostly organized nonsense. John had held 
high political office and left it with a lifelong abhorrence of political "Realism" and large-scale 
power politics. For him, creative problem solving was something that generally took place in the 
absence of power and power-based bargaining. Jim, on the other hand, had worked for 
government when it seemed to be the sole support of the powerless. The problem, for him, was 
bad men misusing power, not power per se. 
The contrast between the two conflict specialists was complex. Laue combined a strong 
conviction that means determine ends7 with a view of political "reality" as omnipresent and 
inescapable. Thus, while consistently favoring nonviolent approaches to conflict, he denied that 
one could draw a clear line between problem solving and power bargaining. Burton, by contrast, 
combined a certain realism with regard to means-ends relationships (he was not a thoroughgoing 
pacifist, for example) with a belief that the destiny of conflict resolution was to replace power-
based methods of making political and social decisions.8 John tended to see serious social 
conflict as the product of systemic contradictions; only resolution of these contradictions (and 
reconstruction of failing systems) could resolve deep-rooted conflicts. Jim tended to envision 
conflict as the product of broken relationships that could be repaired by sensitive mediation and 
healed by a combination of amity and institutional reform. 
These philosophical differences connected in surprising ways with other differences of style and 
personality. Jim’s softness of manner, his tact, "people skills," and natural tendency to mediate 
disputes hid a steely inner determination and, sometimes, a hidden political agenda. He was a 
skilled and tenacious persuader and networker who used his influence behind the scenes to 
advance the causes and people he believed in. John’s blunt combativeness had been cultivated in 
the rough and tumble of Cold War politics, and in the intellectual wars that accompanied his 
creation of conflict studies as an academic field out of "Realist"-dominated International 
Relations. 
Although his bark was frequently worse than his bite, some found his directness unsympathetic, 
intimidating, or even insulting. In part, this was because he cared so passionately about ideas, 
believing that effective practice could be based only on sound theory. John particularly detested 
what he called the "Nice Guy Syndrome": the highly personalized, micro-political compromises 
that often turn principled organizations into unconscious promoters of the status quo. By 
contrast, Jim Laue had a typically American distrust of systematic doctrine. "It works in 
practice," he used to joke, "but will it work in theory?" 
The Burton-Laue "Conversations" 
The Burton-Laue "Conversations" (not, heaven forbid, "Debates") began, as I recall, when both 
men recognized that the relatively minor disagreements they had been airing in faculty meetings 
and private discussions were multiplying - and that they were not really so minor. Four three-
hour sessions took place before assembled groups of students and faculty before the enterprise 
petered out. I think that John Burton, the senior member with a dozen important books to his 
credit, was surprised by how tigerish his younger colleague turned out to be in debate. The 
discussions were heated, but both men appeared to enjoy them greatly. The students who 
attended these sessions were quite divided in their sympathies; it was impossible (except, of 
course, to oneself) to declare a "winner." 
An early item of disagreement, interesting for what it implied and foreshadowed, was a dispute 
about "caucusing" - a technique in which the mediator or facilitator discusses the case privately 
and individually with each party in order to advance the progress of the negotiation. Jim 
maintained that caucusing was (not invariably, but ordinarily) an essential tool of the mediator, 
while John insisted quite adamantly that individual caucusing was "not a technique of conflict 
resolution but of dispute settlement." In a problem solving workshop designed to resolve a 
violent social conflict, he explained, the parties will not trust a facilitator who disappears behind 
closed doors with the "enemy." Furthermore, while private discussions with the parties may help 
bring interest-based negotiations to a successful conclusion, caucusing is contraindicated where 
the conflict is generated by unsatisfied basic needs. In such cases, John asserted, the parties must 
discover what the underlying problems are and how to solve them by a process that is entirely 
open and analytical. 
As the discussion proceeded, it became clear that Jim’s view of the third party role differed in 
crucial respects from John’s, and that these variations reflected subtle but important differences 
of emphasis in defining the enterprise of conflict resolution. Jim agreed that the decision to 
caucus or not must always be influenced by the parties’ sensibilities, but he emphasized that by 
talking individually with hostile parties, the mediator is better able to understand them, 
"represent" them to each other, and facilitate their progress toward an agreement. Jim gave the 
goal of reaching agreement a higher priority than John did, an attitude that reflected both his 
intense distaste for violent contention and his liberal optimism. Even a temporary settlement that 
did not identify the root causes of the dispute might prove a step on the long road to long-term 
resolution. For John, on the other hand, the primary purpose of the conflict resolution effort was 
to assist the parties to discover and deal with the hidden sources of their conflict. Mere 
settlement (e.g., the international agreements arrived at by conventional diplomacy) was as often 
a step toward war as toward peace. The common assumption that such agreements generate 
"momentum" toward peace left him cold. 
Each man’s perspective implicated a different set of "third party" roles. In Jim Laue’s view, the 
mediator or facilitator should function as an active intervenor, a middleman whose role included 
translating each party to the other, buffering their antagonism, helping to create a common 
framework for communication, suggesting crucial terms of agreement, and assisting the 
disputants to reach formal consensus. In a sense, Jim operated as if he were a lawyer with both 
sides as his clients. John’s view of third-party facilitation was also activist, but his technique was 
closer to that of the therapist who distances himself from the client in order to focus attention on 
the analysis of underlying systemic problems. According to John, the facilitator ought not 
become too friendly with the parties or spend much energy helping them to like each other 
better. Least of all should he let his or her own sense of justice or fairness influence the 
proceedings. Since the goal of conflict resolution is to expose and eliminate the conflict’s basic 
causes, the only definition of "social justice" relevant to this effort is that of the parties 
themselves. 
Here Jim Laue strongly disagreed. Since elements of power-based bargaining are present even in 
the most analytical process, he insisted, the mediator’s sense of justice is always brought into 
play. This sense operates subtly when he or she presents options for resolving the conflict, or less 
subtly when she helps to "empower" weaker parties to negotiate an agreement that is (also) in 
their interest. As a facilitator, John Burton might claim to be acting in an entirely impartial 
manner, but his own moral and political commitments would inevitably influence his conduct in 
subtle ways. In any case, Jim insisted, the ethics of intervention demand that the facilitator avoid 
promoting or sanctioning procedurally unfair or socially unjust agreements. 
With the mention of "empowerment," Burton would lean forward with a pained smile. "But Jim," 
he would inquire, "if you really intend to ‘empower’ the weaker party, why should the stronger 
party stay at the table for one moment? And what do you mean by ‘justice’? When the parties 
discover a solution to their problem that satisfies their basic needs, they recognize that access to 
the satisfier is power, and that the satisfaction of basic human needs is justice." Other forms of 
apparent power are illusory, John maintained, like the alleged superiority of American military 
might in the Vietnam War. And other forms of justice are entirely subjective, like the victim’s 
"right" in some cultures to revenge himself on the perpetrator. It isn’t the parties’ trust in the 
mediator or in each other that makes for conflict resolution, John insisted; what matters is their 
trust in the solution. And if they have arrived at a solution as the result of a genuinely analytical 
process, the facilitator’s view of its justice or injustice is utterly irrelevant. 
"But, John," Laue would reply, "why do you think the solutions produced by conflict resolution 
workshops often go unimplemented? Isn’t it because the parties can’t sustain collaborative 
relationships after the workshop ends? Aren’t you underestimating the importance of trust?" 
Power counts, too, he argued, since an agreement that accentuates inequalities of power will 
almost certainly be abandoned in time by the weaker party. For this reason, the justice of the 
agreement is an equally important determinant of its durability. The conflicting parties cannot be 
expected to make long-term efforts to implement agreements unless they conform to some 
generally accepted, objective standard of justice. 
Underlying such exchanges were different appreciations of the effectiveness of mediation in 
different social contexts. John denied that one could take methods of mediation used to settle 
disputes among parties sharing basic legal or moral norms, and apply them to resolve conflicts in 
which there was little, if any, "constitutional" consensus. The framers of the U.S. Constitution, 
for example, were able to formulate a new political consensus, in part, because men like Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton distrusted each other enough to bring their latent conflicts to 
the surface and deal with them. But to the extent that the Philadelphia consensus sidestepped 
divisive economic and social issues like the issue of chattel slavery, it laid the groundwork for 
later violent struggle. To resolve deep-rooted conflicts, John Burton insisted, the facilitator must 
help bring this sort of repressed material to the surface, even at the risk of jeopardizing the 
prospects for an agreement. 
Jim Laue, on the other hand, tended to emphasize the similarities between types of human 
conflict, focusing in particular on their emotive (he would have said "human") dimensions. Even 
"consensual," interest-based conflicts, he contended, frequently have deep personal and systemic 
roots. However one categorizes conflict, moreover, the parties will not come to the table unless 
they trust both the mediator and the process. With regard to the U.S. Constitutional Convention, 
for example, Jim would no doubt have pointed out that Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians trusted 
the forum enough to make their dispute safe and productive. In general, conflicting parties will 
not speak frankly with each other unless they have developed amicable personal relationships, 
nor will they implement agreements arrived at unless their collaboration continues outside the 
conflict resolution forum. 
And so it went. Jim’s consistent tendency was to see negotiated settlements, even if incomplete, 
as steps toward peaceful conflict resolution, while to John, limited settlement was often a prelude 
to conflict renewal and escalated violence. John insisted that effective analytical processes must 
remain strictly private, while Jim was committed to developing "Public Dispute Resolution" as a 
necessary supplement to public administration. Laue’s instinct was almost always to soften or 
pacify hostile relationships, while Burton’s was to let conflicts escalate to the point that one 
could diagnose system failures. And while Jim saw little fault and much virtue in the sort of 
"muscle mediation" practiced by powerful intervenors like Jimmy Carter at Camp David, John 
deeply distrusted any facilitator with a peace plan in his pocket and the power to reward or 
punish recalcitrant parties.  
These differences were never resolved; John remained committed above all to analytical problem 
solving and Jim to enlightened negotiation. As in many other cases of differences of opinion 
between the leaders of a new field, the stakes seemed high, and there were strong feelings on 
both sides. Eventually, recognizing that neither man was going to "convert" or vanquish the 
other, both declared a sort of truce.  
Conflict Resolution and Social Justice: 
Morton Deutsch’s Analytical Map 
To understand some of the implications of the Burton-Laue debate for the analysis of social 
justice, it is worth recalling the categories adumbrated by Morton Deutsch in his seminal essay, 
"Three Types of Social Justice."9 According to Deutsch, three concepts of distributive justice are 
available to those seeking to create a Good Society based on principles of cooperation: Equity, 
Equality, and Need. Equity refers to a distribution of goods, services, and intangible values that 
is proportional to the individual merits of the society’s members, however merit may be defined. 
Equality denotes a distribution in which each person is assumed to have a right to the same 
quantity or quality of values regardless of his or her merit. And Need indicates a distribution in 
which values are proportioned to the needs (neither merits nor mere wants) of each individual. 
Deutsch’s ingenious conceptual map presents these types as alternative "pure types," which may 
appear in the real world in various combinations. Examples of each type come readily to mind. 
Equity is probably the most commonly accepted principle, particularly in a capitalist society 
accustomed to accept as just material rewards proportioned to an individual’s commercial 
"merits," for example, his or her diligence at work, capacity for self-denial, willingness to take 
risks, creativity in business matters, and so forth. The principle of Equity justifies inequality, that 
is to say, by reference to an initial unequal distribution of merit. But this concept of justice is 
even more pervasive than strictly bourgeois norms would suggest. The religious notion that good 
people will inherit eternal life while evildoers deserve damnation is another illustration, as is the 
idea that earthly punishments should be proportioned to the heinousness of the crime.  
Although the principle of Equality is less pervasive, it evokes deep and widespread commitment 
in certain areas of human activity, particularly those in which a right or entitlement to values is 
considered a human right. Few people would think of conditioning basic rights like freedom 
from arbitrary state coercion, for example, or the right to receive emergency medical treatment, 
on an individual’s merit. His or her humanity alone validates the claim. Equality becomes a 
controversial concept, however, when it is not clear whether the principle of Equality or Equity 
should govern. Those committed to welfare state concepts, for example, generally assume that 
people have equal rights to a certain minimum standard of living (what Franklin D. Roosevelt 
called "freedom from want"), although their degree of prosperity above that minimum tends to be 
justified by equitable considerations. The concept of "equality of opportunity," so influential in 
the United States, suggests that the principle of Equality should govern people’s starting points in 
economic competition (i.e., no initial disadvantage on account of race, religion, gender, etc.), but 
that the outcome of the struggle to succeed should depend upon individual "merit." 
There are difficulties, of course, with this commonly accepted attempt to combine the principles 
of Equity and Equality. The first is that, given the intractability of social inequality, the notion of 
equal starting points remains a fictitious ideal. While some sources of inequality like racism and 
sexism are now at least legally taboo, others - in particular, "classism" - have not been outlawed 
or morally condemned in capitalist society and remain virtually invisible. A second problem is 
that even if one were to assume an equality of starting points, "merit" has become an opaque 
concept under Late Capitalism and has little relationship to the classical bourgeois virtues. 
Supposing that equality of opportunity were achieved, however, one would still be compelled to 
confront the third basic concept of social justice: the principle of Need.  
Morton Deutsch is quite right to picture Need as an independent ground on which to establish the 
concept of social justice. Imagine that A and B enjoy complete legal and social equality to begin 
with, and that they are indistinguishable on the ground of individual merit. But suppose further 
that A is the child of abusive and neglectful parents, while B was raised by a loving family, or 
that A is a member of an ethnic minority with nationalist aspirations, while B is a member of the 
dominant majority. If, as a result of these experiential or historical differences, A’s basic needs 
for security, identity, self-esteem, and human bonding remain unsatisfied, while the same needs 
in B are fulfilled, a society that treats both individuals according to the principle of Equality will 
not do them justice. Nor can one adapt the principle of Equity to cover the case, since the 
distribution of values here cannot be governed by merit, unless one redefines "merit" to mean 
"need." 
Need is already recognized as a third basis on which to conceive of social justice, since most 
people today accept the justice of providing special facilities or remedies for disadvantaged 
individuals and groups. But for four related reasons, it is probably the most controversial 
category. First, despite a growing interest in the concept, the existence of definable, imperative, 
and universal human needs is still not generally accepted.10 Second, if one accepts the existence 
of such needs and sees most antisocial or self-destructive behavior as the product of a failure to 
satisfy them, it soon becomes evident that very large numbers of people in modern as well as 
developing societies must be considered "disadvantaged." Third, for this reason, it is equally 
clear that accepting need-satisfaction as a social norm will require a massive overhaul of many 
social institutions. And fourth, if one assumes a limited quantity of values, satisfying one 
person’s needs may deprive another person of equity, equality, or need-satisfaction.11 
As a result, if one were to rank Morton Deutsch’s three types of social justice in terms of their 
current influence, Equity would top the hierarchy, followed by Equality, and, last, by Need. 
Deutsch avoids ranking them, apparently assuming that these are coordinate and combinable 
concepts. But notice that it is also possible to think of them as ranked in an order that reverses 
their current influence and that represents three stages of social development. Traditional society, 
and capitalist society at its most conservative, is governed by the principle of Equity, which dates 
back to Aristotle. Democratic society, from the American and French revolutions onward, has 
added to Equity (and, to some extent, challenged or replaced it) the principle of human Equality. 
And the Good Society of the future, while maintaining both Equity and Equality in their proper 
spheres, will recognize as its highest value the imperative of satisfying basic human Needs.  
Conclusion: Some Implications of the 
Burton-Laue Conversations 
Placing the Burton-Laue discussions in the context of Deutsch’s analysis reveals underlying 
differences between the two ICAR colleagues’ approach to the issue of social justice. Jim Laue’s 
approach seems similar to that of Morton Deutsch himself. That is, it reflected the belief that 
Equity, Equality, and Need represent alternative concepts of social justice, each of which is 
supreme in its appropriate sphere, and none of which can be said to enjoy any general priority 
over the others. In Laue’s view, these concepts were both combinable, as in the notion of 
"equality of opportunity," and capable of being negotiated as legal rights are, by "balancing" 
them against other people’s needs and other criteria of social justice. Jim was serious about social 
justice and the need for social reform, but he was neither a radical egalitarian, proposing the 
abolition of all social distinctions, nor a radical "necessitarian," viewing need-satisfaction as the 
highest form of social justice.  
Philosophically, Jim’s views were perhaps closest to those of John Rawls, who defined Equality 
as the essence of justice, but who located that value in the realm of the ideal: a Good to be 
approached incrementally and progressively, but perhaps never fully realized.12 In Rawls’s view, 
one crucial test of the justice of a social action is whether it tends over the long run to lessen the 
gap between the strongest and weakest members of society. This seems quite close to what Jim 
Laue, also a liberal pragmatist, meant by "empowerment." In fact, Jim did not made a hard 
distinction between the "interests" vindicated by the Equity perspective, the "rights" of the 
Equality perspective, and the "human needs" of the Needs perspective. Conflict resolution, in his 
view, was part of a broader program of incremental, nonviolent reform leading to the gradual 
transformation of the social system in the direction of social justice.  
In one respect, however, neither Deutsch’s nor Rawls’s views subsume Laue’s perspective. Jim 
believed strongly that peaceful, incremental social transformation could take place only if 
motivated by a combination of social affection (Christian love or agape, as he might have put it) 
and enlightened self-interest. This is one reason he parted company with John Burton, since in 
Burton’s view, nothing can substitute for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Reason and 
affection have their roles; the former helps one discover unsatisfied needs and devise 
collaborative methods of satisfying them, and the latter can help satisfy specific needs like those 
for self-esteem and human bonding. But human needs themselves, John insisted are not 
amenable to negotiation; they are not "for trading." And love, although a pearl of great price, is a 
specific, not a universal satisfier. 
At bottom, John Burton’s approach rejects the assumption that Equity, Equality, and Need are 
coordinate, combinable, or "balanceable" concepts of social justice. Rather, somewhat like the 
early Marx,13 but with conflict resolution rather than justice itself in focus, Burton tends to place 
them on a hierarchy topped by Need. Since John has not addressed these issues directly, I am 
forced to speculate somewhat, but I believe that he would consider Equity, with its meritocratic 
justification for an unequal distribution of values, a more limited form of justice, since 
definitions of "merit" in existing society are closely tied to the system of elite power and 
privilege that he has consistently defined as the chief obstacle to genuine conflict resolution.14 
Equality he might well consider a step up from Equity, but not so much in the legalistic sense 
suggested by the concept of human rights as in the socio-psychological sense imported by human 
needs. Human equality, in Burton’s view, is not based on our Adamic inheritance or on legal fiat, 
nor is it (a la Jefferson and Franklin) "self-evident." It is the result of needs for identity, 
recognition, security, and human development that are universal and ontological, although how 
they are expressed and satisfied will vary with the individual and his or her culture.15 
In Burton’s view, the satisfaction of basic human needs is the highest form of social justice, or, 
perhaps I should say, the most relevant form of justice when it comes to resolving deep-rooted, 
destructive social conflicts. John’s disagreement with Jim Laue was based, above all, on Jim’s 
unwillingness to join him in drawing a relatively clear line between consensual, "interest-based" 
conflicts negotiable by applying criteria based on equitable or egalitarian principles, and violent, 
"needs-based" conflicts that do not yield to conventional bargaining or democratic political 
solutions, but that can be resolved only by identifying and satisfying the relevant basic needs. 
While these differences of approach were - and are - arguable, it may also be worth noting that 
they also reflect differences in modes of thought. Jim Laue remained not only a pragmatist but a 
relativist whose natural tendency was to locate competing ideas along the lines of some single 
continuum. John Burton, more philosophically inclined, was attracted to the harder, brighter, 
more subversive distinctions of the either/or. 
Who had the better of the debate? One answer, accurate enough in its way, is to declare the affair 
a draw, since the field of conflict analysis and resolution has incorporated the thought of both 
Jim Laue and John Burton in its theory and practice. If one examines the recent peacemaking 
initiative between Palestinians and Israelis, for example, one finds strong Burtonian elements 
(analytical problem-solving, especially under Norwegian auspices; a focus on identifying and 
satisfying the parties’ relevant identity and security needs; "Track Two" discussions leading to 
"Track One" diplomacy), as well as marked Lauean features (the importance of personal 
relationships and trust-building; utilization of third-party techniques like caucusing; "muscle 
mediation" at crucial junctures by the United States). The contradiction between Burton’s and 
Laue’s perspectives has not been resolved, but the field has "managed" it (in a sense that would 
have appealed more to Jim than to John) by embracing the inconsistency.  
Perhaps, in the end, one decides which position makes the most sense on the basis of one’s own 
intellectual preferences and judgment as to the primary needs of the field. My own predilection, I 
must confess, is for the either/or - and for a form of conflict resolution that defines itself, above 
all, as the art and science of helping parties in conflict to identify and satisfy their basic needs. I 
am less sanguine than either Jim Laue or John Burton about the possibility of "converting" the 
administrators of the pax Americana-Europa to the norms of peaceful conflict resolution, but I 
agree that we must try. At the same time, a conception of social justice that sees human 
development culminating in a worldwide drive to satisfy basic human needs seems to me a 
potent catalyst for desperately needed social change. 
Thus, more than five years after Jim’s untimely death and more than a decade after he and John 
Burton conducted their impromptu "conversations," the important discussion that they began 
continues. All those currently theorizing and practicing in the fields of peace studies and conflict 
resolution are its beneficiaries.  
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